Overview
Browser-extension password managers, which autofill sensitive information on websites, can be exposed to various clickjacking attacks. These attacks exploit the trust relationship between a web page and the user-interface elements injected by the extension. Recent studies show that Document Object Model (DOM-level) manipulation can bypass many standard clickjacking defenses, leaving several password managers at risk when users navigate to a malicious or compromised website. Users should promptly install vendor updates and carefully weigh the security risks of using password-manager features such as autofill of sensitive information that trade convenience for potential exposure
Description
Clickjacking is a malicious technique that usually involves tricking a user into clicking something that looks safe or normal to interact with so that an attacker can gain some kind of sensitive information or perform an action that they otherwise would not be able to do.
Though clickjacking is a well known attack that has many mitigations across many product areas, novel methods of execution still appear. Unlike traditional iframe-based clickjacking attacks, DOM-based clickjacking exploits the fact that browser extensions can sometimes allow interactive elements to be injected directly into a website’s DOM. DOM is desribed in stands MDN Web Docs as

the data representation of the objects that comprise the structure and content of a document on the web. It represents the page so that programs can change the document structure, style, and content. The DOM represents the document as nodes and objects; that way, programming languages can interact with the page (MDN Web Docs).

Since JavaScript has the ability to manipulate the visual elements injected by a browser extension, these elements can be made invisible to the user while preserving click handlers so that attackers can trick users to interact with password manager extension functions. This behavior can be guided by website elements that users are already feel safe and familiar with such as cookie consent banners, pop-up ads, or CAPTCHA prompts.
Password managers inject user-interface elements into web pages to enable autofill functionality, creating an inherent tension between usability and security. Clickjacking exploits rely on user interaction with maliciously crafted content, making responsibility for mitigation a shared concern. Effective defenses require coordinated effort: web developers must implement clickjacking protections, password-manager vendors must harden extension behavior, and users must understand and manage residual risk. No single party can eliminate the vulnerability on its own.
Impact
Successful clickjacking of a browser-extension password manager could allow an attacker to trick users into unintentionally revealing or auto-filling credentials, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive accounts and stored passwords. Because DOM-based techniques can bypass common defenses, multiple browsers and password-manager vendors remain variably exposed while mitigations continue to evolve.
Solution
Review the Vendor Information section for any browser or password manager extension specific updates and mitigation steps. Apply the latest updates from both the browser and the password-manager extension vendors. Where applicable, users should consider disabling or limiting autofill functionality or adjusting related settings to reduce exposure when concerned about clickjacking exposure. Users must also recognize that the level of control may vary from product-to-product, and that clickjacking attempts may occur on trusted websites if they have been compromised.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Marek Tóth in presenting the research and Jonathan Leitschuh for reporting this research to us. This document was written by Ben Koo.

Overview
A vulnerability in cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) headers in Chromium, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Safari, and Firefox enables the CORS policy to be manipulated. Combined with a DNS rebind, an attacker can send arbitrary requests to services listening on arbitrary ports regardless of CORS policy in place by the target. Users should apply the mitigations provided by the browser suppliers by applying the updates accordingly.
Description
Cross-origin resource sharing is a mechanism that allows a server to indicate any origins (domain, scheme, or port) other than its own that are permitted to load resources in the browser. For example, when a website needs to access your account data from a different website, a CORS policy is usually one of the best ways to set up that communication. However, CORS can be incorrectly implemented depending on the use case. As a result, attackers can exploit CORS misconfigurations or even chain them with other vulnerabilities to affect a system.
A DNS rebinding attack abuses the way browsers rely on hostnames to recognize different servers across a network. Hostnames are not directly bound to network devices and can be resolved to an arbitrary IP address dictated by a domain owner’s DNS record. Attackers can abuse a victim’s browser as a proxy to extend the attack surface to private networks. For example, an attacker tricks a victim into opening a malicious website where it scans for open web services in local networks. After locating target services, the attacker can then make an educated guess as to which of those services’s IP address to rebind to the malicious website in order to access its resources without violating the same-origin policy.
The ability to conduct a DNS rebinding attack and manipulating CORS headers in order to enable malicious exfiltration of data has been observed to be successful on Chromium, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Safari, and Firefox. An attacker can use a malicious site to execute a JavaScript payload that periodically sends CORS headers in order to ask the server if the cross-origin request is safe and allowed. Naturally, the attacker-controlled hostname will respond with permissive CORS headers that will circumvent the CORS policy. The attacker then performs a DNS rebind attack so that the hostname is assigned the IP address of the target service. After the DNS responds with the changed IP address, the new target inherits the relaxed CORS policy, allowing an attacker to potential exfiltrate data from the target.
Mozilla has assigned CVE-2025-8036 for this vulnerability.
Impact
The impact depends on the target. Exposure of private networks and unauthorized access to sensitive data are all within the realm of possibility.
Solution
DNS rebind attacks can have serious consequences when exploited, so we recommend keeping your browser up to date for the latest vulnerability patches.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the reporter who wishes to remain anonymous. This document was written by Ben Koo.

Overview
Clevo’s UEFI firmware update packages included sensitive private keys used in their Intel Boot Guard implementation. This accidental exposure of the keys could be abused by an attacker to sign malicious firmware using Clevo’s Boot Guard trust chain, potentially compromising the pre-boot UEFI environment on systems where Clevo’s implementation has been adopted.
Description
Intel Boot Guard is a platform integrity technology, providing a root of trust that protects the earliest stages of the boot process. It cryptographically verifies the Initial Boot Block (IBB) and prevents the execution of untrusted firmware. Operating before UEFI is initialized, Boot Guard ensures that only authenticated firmware is executed during the earliest pre-boot stage. Boot Guard is often confused with UEFI Secure Boot, but Secure Boot operates later in the process, enforcing trust within the UEFI firmware execution phase and during the transition from UEFI to the operating system.
Clevo Co. is a computer hardware and firmware manufacturer that operates as both an Original Design Manufacturer (ODM) and an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), producing laptops and UEFI firmware used by various personal computer brands. One of Clevo’s publicly released UEFI software executables included private keys integral to its Boot Guard trust chain. Because Clevo’s firmware is integrated into products from other manufacturers, the exposure may have supply chain implications extending beyond Clevo-branded systems.
Impact
An attacker with write access to flash storage for a system, whether through physical access or a privileged software update mechanism, could abuse the leaked keys to sign and install malicious firmware. Such firmware would be trusted at the early stages that will be protected by Boot Guard, allowing compromise of the affected UEFI systems and thus enabling persistent and stealthy control over the device.
Solution
While Clevo has reportedly removed the affected software containing the leaked keys, no public remediation steps have been announced by Clevo at this time.
Users of Clevo-based devices, including those from other OEMs that integrate Clevo firmware, should:
* Assess their exposure to affected firmware versions.
* Monitor systems for unauthorized firmware modifications.
* Apply firmware updates only from verified and trusted sources.
Acknowledgements
This issue was responsibly disclosed by the Binarly Research Team, with initial reporting by Thierry Laurion. This document was written by Vijay Sarvepalli.