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Overview
The Howyar UEFI Application “Reloader” (32-bit and 64-bit), distributed as part of SysReturn prior to version 10.2.02320240919, is vulnerable to the execution of arbitrary software from a hard-coded path. An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can bypass the UEFI Secure Boot feature and execute unsigned code during the boot process in the UEFI context.
Description
The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) is a specification for firmware architecture that facilitates interaction between a computing platform’s hardware and operating system during the early boot phase. When a UEFI-compliant computer is powered on, the UEFI implementation (including multiple UEFI applications) is the first software to run, preceding the operating system. UEFI applications are typically digitally signed, often by the Microsoft UEFI Certificate Authority (CA), ensuring their trusted execution under UEFI Secure Boot. UEFI bootloaders, a type of UEFI application, provide early boot management, loading OS files into protected memory areas for execution. These bootloaders can execute additional software and load drivers as part of their startup processes.
The Howyar Reloader UEFI application, an UEFI bootloader available in both 32-bit and 64-bit versions, has been found to contain an arbitrary code execution vulnerability. Researchers at ESET discovered that the application allows execution of UEFI software from a hard-coded path without verifying its signature. This occurs because the Reloader does not use UEFI’s standard BootServices LoadImage() API for safe application execution. Consequently, any unsigned third-party software can be executed during the early boot phase with high privileges in the UEFI context. Since the Reloader application is signed by the trusted Microsoft UEFI CA, it can be installed on any UEFI-compliant system. Furthermore, as it is bundled and distributed as part of supply-chain software, it may also be present in other UEFI implementations provided by software suppliers or OEMs.
An attacker with the ability to update the UEFI bootloader can exploit this vulnerability to run arbitrary code, bypassing UEFI Secure Boot. On systems where a vulnerable version of the Reloader application is present, an attacker only needs to install a malicious unsigned UEFI application in a hard-coded path to achieve Secure Boot bypass and execute code in the UEFI context.
To mitigate this vulnerability, updated Reloader should be installed on the affected systesm. It is also essential that all UEFI compliant computers also update their Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database (DBX or Revocation List), supplied by the UEFI Forum. This update should be applied to the special SPI flash memory on the motherboard, which stores firmware data. Maintaining the integrity of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem requires the timely application of these updates.
Impact
An attacker can bypass Secure Boot at system startup and execute arbitrary code before the operating system (OS) loads. Code executed in this early boot phase can persist on the system, potentially loading malicious kernel extensions that survive both reboots and OS reinstallation. Additionally, it may evade detection by OS-based and endpoint detection and response (EDR) security measures.
Solution
Apply a Patch
Howyar Technologies and their partners have released updated software to address this vulnerability. Please follow their guidance to install the updated version of the software. Additionally, Microsoft has indicated that they intend to provide an updated DBX (Revocation List) file around January 14, 2025. These updates may also be delivered by your OEM or OS vendor to ensure the Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database (DBX) is up to date. Microsoft Windows users can follow instructions in Check-UEFISecureBootVariables on verifying the latest SecureBoot updates were applied and also find out if it is safe to apply these updates. For Linux users, seeBlog fwupd-2.0.4 which provides you with instructions on changes to fwupd to support this update.
Recommendations for Enterprises and Developers
As changes to the DBX(Forbidden Signature Database) file can lead to system instability, vendors are urged to thoroughly test the updates to ensure they do not render systems unusable. Note: Update the DB (Signature Database) before applying the DBX, this means you should update the trusted list of boot applications first, before updating the list of revoked boot application. Enterprises and cloud providers managing large numbers of systems should prioritize applying these updates and ensure the DBX file changes are implemented reliably to prevent loading of unsigned binaries in the virtual machine boot process. Microsoft has provided a secureboot_objects GitHub repository with the DBX files and additional tools. Enterprises that use installable boot media such as CDROM or Network Media (PXE or HTTP) should ensure all the media files are updated as well that were previously signed by now blocked digital certificate Microsoft Windows Production PCA (Product Certificate Authority) 2011.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Martin Smolar of ESET for his responsible disclosure of this vulnerability to Howyar Technologies and other affected vendors. Thanks also to Howyar Technologies that closely worked with the researcher and CERT/CC to resolve this vulnerability. This document was written by Vijay Sarvepalli.