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Overview
PDQ Deploy is a service intended for usage by system administrators for the deployment of software or updates to targeted machines within their network. PDQ Deploy uses “run modes” to deploy software to their target devices. The run mode “Deploy User” insecurely creates credentials on the target device. These credentials are deleted from the device following a full deployment of a software file, however, an attacker with access to the target device can compromise these credentials prior to deletion through common password tools such as Mimikatz. These credentials could then be used to gain administrator access on the target device, or to compromise any other device using these credentials that is enrolled through active directory and has previously had software deployed to it by PDQ Deploy.
Description
PDQ Deploy is a service intended for usage by system administrators and others for the deployment of software or updates to targeted machines within their network. PDQ Deploy has various configurations, including automated deployment and availability based deployments. PDQ Deploy also uses various “run modes” to deploy software to their target devices. The “Deploy User” run mode can use a domain or local account with administrator rights on the target computer during the deployment process.
The deployment process is as follows:
1: PDQ Deploy initiates an application deployment.
2: The central server connects to the target device remotely with the “Deploy User” credentials.
3: A local service is created on the device and is run as the selected domain or local user account specified as the deploy user.
4: PDQ follows the application deployment process, installing the requested software.
5: The service is removed from the remote device.
An attacker with access to the device can use a password dumping tool, such as Mimikatz, to dump these credentials during the deployment process, specifically during steps 2 to 4, prior to their deletion. If using a domain user, these credentials created by the Deploy User domain account are static and can be used to compromise any other device that is enrolled in PDQ Deploy through Active Directory sharing this user, allowing for lateral movement.
PDQ Deploy supports other “Run Modes” for use during the deployment process. These run modes alter how credentials are saved on the device. These include the “Local System” deploy mode, in which the service is ran as a Local System account. A Local System account has lower privileges than a domain account, but PDQ Deploy still uses the Deploy User Account to connect to the device and initiate the Local System account, resulting in the vulnerabilities still being present for that user.
Impact
An attacker with access to the PDQ Deploy service and the ability to execute common password tools such as Mimikatz can dump the Deploy User administrator credentials from a device during the deployment process, then use those credentials to either further compromise the current device, or move laterally and compromise other PDQ Deploy enrolled systems on the Active Directory system that share the user and use a domain account. The compromised machine must have been previously deployed to via PDQ Deploy.
Solution
The CERT/CC is creating this Vulnerability Note to advise and make users of PDQ Deploy aware of potential avenues of attack through the deploy service. System administrators that are using PDQ Deploy should employ LAPS to mitigate this vulnerability. System administrators could also follow the recommendations outlined in the How-to-Guides listed on the PDQ Deploy website. (https://help.pdq.com/hc/en-us/articles/360033877651-Adding-and-Using-Multiple-Credentials-in-PDQ-Deploy-Inventory) Additionally, alternate deploy modes could be used. The “Logged on User” deploy mode utilizes the active credentials of the device currently logged in to create the necessary services and deploy the requested software.This deploy mode does not create a service with the domain/local credentials, and as such, is an appropriate deployment mode to avoid the vulnerability. It should be noted this Run Mode is only available on the Enterprise mode, and requires user input to complete the deployment of the software.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the reporter who wishes to remain anonymous. A French source validated and coordinated this vulnerability note and case with CERT/CC. This document was written by Christopher Cullen.

Overview
A command injection vulnerability has been identified in the Wi-Fi Test Suite, a tool developed by the WiFi Alliance, which has been found deployed on Arcadyan routers. This flaw allows an unauthenticated local attacker to exploit the Wi-Fi Test Suite by sending specially crafted packets, enabling the execution of arbitrary commands with root privileges on the affected routers.
Description
The Wi-Fi Test Suite, as described by its developer, was originally created by the Wi-Fi Alliance—a global non-profit industry association responsible for Wi-Fi standards—to support the development of certification programs and device certification. This software was not designed for use in production environments. However, it has been discovered in commercial router deployments, exposing a vulnerbility in the test code in production. The Wi-Fi Test Suite contains vulnerable code that is susceptible to command injection attacks. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending specially crafted packets to a device running the Wi-Fi Test Suite, allowing them to execute commands with administrative (root) privileges.
CVE-2024-41992
It is possible for an unauthenticated local attacker to use specially crafted packets to execute commands as root.
Impact
An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can gain full administrative control over the affected device. With this access, the attacker can modify system settings, disrupt critical network services, or reset the device entirely. These actions can result in service interruptions, compromise of network data, and potential loss of service for all users dependent on the affected network.
Solution
The CERT/CC recommends that vendors, who have included the Wi-Fi Test Suite, to update it to version >=9.0 or remove it entirely from production devices to reduce the risk of exploitation.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the reporter Noam Rathaus from SSD Disclosure. This document was written by Timur Snoke.